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Experiencing a body part as one’s own, i.e., body ownership, depends on the integration
of multisensory bodily signals (including visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information)
with the visual top-down signals from peripersonal space. Although it has been shown
that the visuo-spatial viewpoint from where the body is seen is an important visual
top-down factor for body ownership, different studies have reported diverging results.
Furthermore, the role of visuo-spatial viewpoint (sometime also called first-person
perspective) has only been studied for hands or the whole body, but not for the
lower limbs. We thus investigated whether and how leg visuo-tactile integration and leg
ownership depended on the visuo-spatial viewpoint from which the legs were seen and
the anatomical similarity of the visual leg stimuli. Using a virtual leg illusion, we tested the
strength of visuo-tactile integration of leg stimuli using the crossmodal congruency effect
(CCE) as well as the subjective sense of leg ownership (assessed by a questionnaire).
Fifteen participants viewed virtual legs or non-corporeal control objects, presented either
from their habitual first-person viewpoint or from a viewpoint that was rotated by 90°
(third-person viewpoint), while applying visuo-tactile stroking between the participants
legs and the virtual legs shown on a head-mounted display. The data show that the first-
person visuo-spatial viewpoint significantly boosts the visuo-tactile integration as well as
the sense of leg ownership. Moreover, the viewpoint-dependent increment of the visuo-
tactile integration was only found in the conditions when participants viewed the virtual
legs (absent for control objects). These results confirm the importance of first person
visuo-spatial viewpoint for the integration of visuo-tactile stimuli and extend findings from
the upper extremity and the trunk to visuo-tactile integration and ownership for the legs.
Keywords: crossmodal congruency effect, visuo-spatial viewpoint, body ownership, body illusion, legs
INTRODUCTION
The experience of the body as one’s own (i.e., the sense of body ownership), and its location in
space, critically depend on multisensory and sensorimotor integration of bodily signals (Gallagher,
2000; Jeannerod, 2003; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Longo et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke,
2012). The multisensory representation of one’s body and its parts as well as body ownership are
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based on the integration and weighting of different sensory bodily
inputs (proprioceptive, tactile, visual, auditory, vestibular, and
visceral) according to spatio-temporal laws ofmultisensory bodily
perception (Macaluso andMaravita, 2010; Blanke, 2012; Apps and
Tsakiris, 2014; Samad et al., 2015). These bottom-upmultisensory
and motor signals are further integrated and compared with
more stable, offline body representations, such as perceptual,
conceptual and semantic knowledge of the body (Carruthers,
2008; deVignemont, 2010; Longo et al., 2010; Serino andHaggard,
2010), as well as visual top-down signals about the form and
position of the body (Blanke et al., 2015).
The sense of body ownership may fail in various neurological
conditions producing erroneous and disturbed body perceptions,
for example disownership of one’s hand in somatoparaphrenia
(Vallar and Ronchi, 2009; Romano et al., 2014), ownership for
supernumerary limbs (Halligan et al., 1993; Guterstam et al.,
2011) or seeing one’s body from a third-person viewpoint as in
out-of-body experiences (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Blanke and
Arzy, 2005; Blanke and Mohr, 2005; Bunning and Blanke, 2005).
Moreover, presenting conflicting multisensory information about
the location and appearance of one’s body or body part can
experimentally modify the sense of body ownership. For example,
in the rubber hand illusion participants see a rubber hand while
their real hand is hidden from view. When both, the rubber and
real hands are stroked in synchrony, the visual information usually
biases proprioceptive signals resulting in illusory ownership for
the rubber hand and in the experience of illusory touch, that
is the perception of feeling touch as arising from the rubber
hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Successful induction of bodily
illusion through multisensory conflicts have been shown at the
level of fingers (Dieguez et al., 2009), hands (Rubber hand illusion:
Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), feet (Lenggenhager et al., 2015) or
an entire body (Full body illusion: Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager
et al., 2007).
It has been argued that in order to experience body ownership,
this multisensory body representation needs to be coded in a
common, egocentric reference frame, characterized by seeing
the body from a first-person visuo-spatial viewpoint (Blanke
et al., 2002; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009). Several studies have shown that illusory ownership over
a rubber hand is strongest when the rubber hand is seen close
to the body (Lloyd, 2007) and from a first-person viewpoint
that is at an anatomically plausible position (Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007;
Guterstam et al., 2011). Conversely, an induction of the RHI
was achieved also in the absence of a first-person viewpoint,
when tactile stimulation of the rubber hand was only seen in a
mirror (Bertamini et al., 2011). Similarly, seeing another person’s
face (third-person viewpoint) being touched in synchrony with
one’s own face, leads to an enfacement illusion, evoking changes
in the mental representation of one’s own face (Tsakiris, 2008;
Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012). The effect
of visuo-spatial viewpoint on whole body ownership has also
been investigated by testing the effects of different viewpoints
from which a body (Petkova et al., 2011; Pfeiffer et al., 2014)
is seen. Several studies found that body ownership is stronger
from first-person visuo-spatial viewpoints as compared to shifted
or rotated viewpoints (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al.,
2010; Petkova et al., 2011; Maselli and Slater, 2013). Moreover,
it has been shown that illusory ownership for a virtual body
can also be induced when the virtual body is visually presented
from a posterior third-person viewpoint (Lenggenhager et al.,
2007; Aspell et al., 2009, 2013), but that additional third-person
viewpoint changes did not modulate ownership for a virtual
body (Pfeiffer et al., 2014). Also, the fact that in the evoked or
spontaneous cases of out-of-body experiences people experience
seeing their own body from a third-person point of view, despite
reporting strong body ownership at the elevated and disembodied
position (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Blanke and Mohr, 2005;
Aspell et al., 2013), demonstrates that the relation between bodily
self-consciousness (including body ownership) and the first-
person visuo-spatial viewpoint is more complex than previously
assumed.
Besides the visuo-spatial viewpoint, other factors have been
shown to significantly affect the strength of bodily illusions. For
example, ownership illusions decrease with longer delays between
the visual and tactile stimulation and larger spatial separations
of the visual and proprioceptive information about the hand
location (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Costantini and Haggard, 2007;
Lloyd, 2007), which is in line with temporal and spatial principles
of multisensory integration (Holmes and Spence, 2005; Stein
and Stanford, 2008). The illusion is also reduced with decreased
anatomical resemblance of the stroked hand (normally in the form
of different objects) with respect to the participants’ real hand
(Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010) or incongruent hand
laterality (Tsakiris andHaggard, 2005), indicating the involvement
of visual top-down modulation in the process of embodiment of
the rubber hand.
The most commonly used measures to assess subjective
experience of illusory ownership of body parts or of a whole
body are questionnaire ratings (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998;
Tsakiris andHaggard, 2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Objective,
reaction-time based evidence has been obtained by using the
crossmodal congruency effect (CCE) task (Spence et al., 1998), in
which participants are asked to respond to tactile stimuli applied
to their body while ignoring visual distractor stimuli, which may
occur at a congruent or an incongruent location with respect to
the tactile (target) stimulus. The CCE has been previously used as
an implicit measure of body ownership, showing that the CCE is
associatedwith a self-attribution of an artificial hand (Pavani et al.,
2000; Zopf et al., 2010) or virtual body (Aspell et al., 2009; Maselli
and Slater, 2014).
Research on body ownership and bodily processing in general
has mostly concentrated on hands (see Tsakiris, 2010, for a
review) or body (see Blanke, 2012, for a review), and only few
studies have investigated how the lower body is represented
in the brain and whether this representation is different from
the one of the hand (Schicke and Röder, 2006; Heed and
Röder, 2008; Schicke et al., 2009; van Elk et al., 2013). In
fact, there are numerous functional differences between upper
and lower limbs, compatible with neural differences in body
ownership mechanisms; in comparison to lower limbs, the hands
are more frequently and with different complexity used for
action and object manipulations; they have more degrees of
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freedom to move, can be positioned in a much wider portion
of the peripersonal space, and frequently interact with other
parts of the body. On contrary, the functional role of the legs
mostly pertains to locomotion, and the range of their possible
positions in space is smaller and is mostly restricted to the sagittal
vertical plane of the body. As a consequence, the integration of
multisensory stimuli related to the feet and surrounding space
might differ from what is described for the hands (van Elk et al.,
2013). While hand actions require hand-centered representation,
locomotive actions require a representation that is foot-centered
and centered on the body midline (Morton and Bastian, 2004;
Kannape et al., 2010; Kannape and Blanke, 2013; Galli et al.,
2015), suggesting that space and body are represented differently
during manual and pedal actions. However, studies, which
directly compared visuo-tactile integration of stimuli related to
hands and feet, yielded inconclusive results. For example, it was
shown that the multisensory representation of the feet does
not differ from that of the hands as inferred from measures
of multisensory integration such as the CCE or temporal order
judgment tasks (Schicke and Röder, 2006; Schicke et al., 2009).
However, another study confirmed that the magnitude of the
CCE did not differ between hands and feet, but only when
they were in an anatomical, uncrossed position, indicating a
similar peripersonal space representation (van Elk et al., 2013).
However, when the limbs were crossed, only hand CCEs were
affected, but not feet CCEs, pointing to a difference between hands
and feet in the integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive
signals.
In the present study we investigated whether visuo-tactile
integration for leg stimuli (assessed by the CCE) and leg
ownership depend on the visuo-spatial viewpoint and the
anatomical similarity of the legs’ shape. In a virtual leg illusion,
virtual legs were visually presented to the participants on a
head-mounted display (HMD), so that they saw virtual legs as
superimposed over their physical legs. The virtual legs were either
shown from the participant’s habitual first-person viewpoint, or
as rotated by 90°, to simulate a third-person viewpoint. To induce
ownership for the virtual legs we followed the established protocol
of visuo-tactile stimulation as for the rubber hand. Visuo-tactile
stroking was applied either at a virtual legs or a virtual control
object not resembling human legs (Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris and
Haggard, 2005; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al., 2009, 2013;
Salomon et al., 2012).We predicted that seeing legs in first-person
viewpoint would result in stronger body ownership and higher
CCE score as compared to the conditions where the legs are seen
from the third-person viewpoint or where, instead of legs, wooden
blocks are presented.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Nineteen right-handed healthy participants from the student
population at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)
took part in the experiment (5 females, mean age 25.8 3.8 years,
range 18–33 years). All participants had normal or corrected-
to normal sight and no psychiatric or neurological history.
Their participation in the study was reimbursed (20 CHF).
They had no previous experiences with the task or experimental
paradigm. All participants gave written informed consent;
the study was approved by the ethics committee of EPFL
and was performed in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The data of four participants were not included in
the analysis due to a technical problem (two participants) and
due to the below-chance performance at the CCE task (two
participants).
Virtual Leg Illusion Paradigm
The virtual leg illusion paradigm was adapted from the rubber
hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and full body illusion
paradigms (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova
and Ehrsson, 2008) to study the role of visuo-spatial viewpoint
in the embodiment of lower limbs. Subjects were comfortably
sitting in a chair wearing a HMD (HMD, V-Real Viewer 3D
SVGA, 800  600 pixels image resolution, 35° field of view,
VRealities). The virtual legs or wooden objects were placed on
another chair, mimicking a usual sitting position. A video camera
recorded the virtual legs or wooden objects from a height and
angle that corresponded to a subjective first person viewpoint and
the video was projected in real time (except for asynchronous
blocks, see below) onto the HMD. Thus, the subjects viewed
the virtual legs or wooden objects as superimposed over their
real legs (they were instructed to look in the direction of their
legs). White noise was presented over headphones to mask
the noise from the vibrators and surrounding. To induce the
virtual leg illusion, the experimenter irregularly tapped (on
average 2 taps per second) the participant’s left leg (dorsal
surface between the knee and hip) and the corresponding virtual
leg with a wooden stick. The subjects therefore viewed the
virtual leg or wooden objects being tapped via the HMD and
feel the touch applied to their real leg. Simultaneous tactile
stimulation of the left and right leg would be preferred during
illusion induction, however, due to the limitation of the manual
application of tapping, only lateralized leg stimulation was
possible.
In the synchronous conditions the “seen tapping” and “felt
tapping” matched spatially and temporally, whereas in the
asynchronous blocks the visual information was delayed for
500 ms (using a video delaying device). The visuo-spatial
viewpoint wasmanipulated by presenting subjects with the virtual
legs (or wooden objects) in their habitual first-person viewpoint
or in a third-person viewpoint, where the video image of the
virtual legs (or wooden objects) was rotated by 90° anticlockwise.
Each phase of illusion induction lasted for 60 s. The virtual leg
illusion paradigm is shown in Figure 1.
Crossmodal Congruency Effect Task
In order to study the role of visuo-spatial perspective in the
embodiment of virtual legs or wooden objects, we adapted
a behavioral task known as Crossmodal distractor congruency
task by Spence et al. (1998). In this task participants are
asked to make speeded judgments about the position of a
tactile stimulus applied to their body, while ignoring visual
distractor stimulus occurring at the spatially congruent or at
an incongruent location with respect to the tactile (target)
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. (A) (LEFT) Virtual leg illusion. The experimenter simultaneously applies tactile stimuli to the participant’s leg and to the filmed virtual
legs or wooden objects using a wooden stick. (A) RIGHT The participant wears a head-mounted display onto which the real-time (delayed in asynchronous
condition) video of the virtual legs or wooden objects is projected. Four vibrating devices are attached to the participant’s legs. (B) (LEFT) The virtual legs or wooden
objects as seen by the participant through the head-mounted display, presented in first- or third-person viewpoint. The red dots represent the positions of vibrotactile
stimuli and visual distractors during the crossmodal congruency task. In the congruent conditions the vibrotactile stimulus and visual distractor appeared at the same
location, whereas in the incongruent conditions they appeared at the same side but at a different position.
stimulus. The responses are usually slowed down when the
distractor appears at an incongruent location. The reaction
time (RT) difference between the incongruent and congruent
trials is defined as CCE. The task has been extensively used to
investigate multisensory integration in relation with peripersonal
space and body representation as the CCE is larger when the
visual distractors appear closer to the tactile (target) cue (Spence
et al., 1998, 2004) or when the visual distractors are presented
on a body part or whole body, which visually resemble a real
human body (Pavani et al., 2000; Austen et al., 2004; Aspell
et al., 2009). Thus, the task has been as such used as an implicit
measure of hand (Pavani et al., 2000; Pavani and Castiello, 2004;
Spence et al., 2004; Shore et al., 2006; Igarashi et al., 2010)
and body ownership (Aspell et al., 2009; Maselli and Slater,
2014).
In the present study the vibrotactile stimuli were delivered
by four vibration devices, each consisting of a small vibrating
motor [Precision MicroDrives shaftless vibration motors, model
312–101, 3V, 60 mA, 9000 rpm (150 Hz), 5 g]. The motors
had a surface area (the area touching the participant’s leg) of
113 mm2. The activation of the motors gave a clearly perceived
and easy-to-localize stimulation. Two devices were attached to
each of the participants’ legs using a medical tape: on each leg,
the “upper” device was positioned approximately 3 cm from
the knee and the “lower” device 25 cm below (Figure 1). The
visual distractors were displayed through the HMD as a red
dot at four different positions corresponding to the location
of the vibrotactile motors. Vibro-tactile and visual distractors
were presented simultaneously for 35 ms (stimuli onset was
synchronous). In the congruent trials, the visual distractor
appeared as superimposed to the activated vibrotactile stimulator
(same position), whereas in the incongruent trials the visual
distractor appeared at the opposite elevation, on the same side
(same leg) according to the participant egocentric reference
frame. The locations of appeared vibrotactile stimuli and visual
distractors were balanced and randomized. The task in each
experimental condition consisted of 96 trials (48 congruent
and 48 incongruent; 48 were delivered with upper vibrotactile
motors and 48 with lower; 48 on the right and 48 on the left
leg). Stimulus timings were controlled by a program written
with ExpyVR, a custom-built multimedia stimuli presentation
software, developed with Python 2.6 and the Open Graphics
Library v.2.2 (http://lnco.epfl.ch/).
The subjects were instructed to direct their gaze toward
their real legs and fixate on the middle of the video conveyed
through HMD. They were asked to make speeded judgments of
whether they felt the vibrotactile stimulus at upper (knee level)
or lower (hip level) position on their legs (with respect to their
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TABLE 1 | Virtual leg illusion questionnaire.
Item Label
1 I had the impression that the legs/objects Ownership
I was looking at were my real legs.
2 I had the impression that the Illusory touch
touch I saw was applied to my legs.
3 I had the impression of being Illusion of motor agency
able to move the legs/objects.
4 I had the impression that my Illusion of proprioceptive rotation
legs had changed position.
The questionnaire included the four statements shown, describing illusory ownership,
illusory touch, illusion of motor agency and illusion of proprioceptive leg rotation, which
served as a control question for suggestibility. Participants indicated their response on a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “completely agree” (+++) to “completely disagree”
(   ).
anatomical reference frame), regardless of the leg laterality, while
ignoring the visual distractors. They responded by pressing one
of two buttons on a keypad with their right hand. After the
stimuli presentation, the participants had 2000 ms to respond
to the tactile target with a button press before the next trial
commenced.
Virtual Leg Illusion Questionnaire
To assess the subjective experience of sense of ownership over the
virtual legs or wooden objects, the participants were asked to rate
4 items from a questionnaire designed to capture the leg illusion,
which was adapted from the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998) and full body illusion (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager
et al., 2007) questionnaires. The items referred to the sense
of leg ownership, illusory touch, sense of motor agency over
the displayed virtual legs or wooden objects, and illusion of
proprioceptive leg rotation. We hypothesized that the sense of
illusory ownership, illusory touch and illusion of motor agency
would be stronger in the condition with synchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation of the virtual legs shown in first-person viewpoint.
On the other hand, the illusion of proprioceptive leg rotation
should be stronger in the synchronous conditionwhere the virtual
legs are presented rotated, in the third-person viewpoint. The
questionnaire items are presented in Table 1. Participants rated to
which degree they agreewith the item statement on a 7-itemLikert
scale ranging from 3 (“completely disagree”) to+3 (“completely
agree”).
Experimental Design
In a 2  2  2 repeated measures design we manipulated
Synchrony of administered visuo-tactile tapping (Synchronous,
Asynchronous), Visuo-spatial viewpoint (first-person, third-
person), and Body similarity (virtual legs, wooden objects), thus
in total encompassing 8 conditions. Each condition consisted
of two illusion induction phases, where the experimenter
applied visuo-tactile tapping to the participant’s leg and the
virtual leg/wooden object for 60 s. Each illusion induction
phase was followed by the CCE task (48 trials). The effects of
the experimental manipulations on multisensory integration
mechanisms were measured with the CCE scores on RT (see
below) and error rate (ER). The subjective experience of
embodiment was assessed with a questionnaire administered at
the end of each condition.
Procedure
The participants were first informed about the procedure of the
experiment and asked to sign an informed consent to participate.
While seated in a chair and wearing an HMD, the experimenter
attached the vibro-tactile motors to the participant’s legs and
aligned the video frame of the virtual legs or wooden objects
to best fit the position of the vibro-tactile motors and the
participant’s point of view. Then the participants were instructed
about the CCE task and underwent a short training session, where
the visual distractors were displayed on a black screen (16 trials).
The experimental procedure was identical for all eight conditions.
Subjects were instructed to orient their gaze in the direction of
their legs, keep their eyes open and fixate on a location in the
middle of the screen, as viewed via the HMD. Each condition
consisted of two illusion-induction phases and two CCE task
blocks (see the Experimental design section above). At the end
of the condition the subjects removed the HMD and filled out
the Illusion questionnaire. They were encouraged to take a short
break before the subsequent block. The order of the conditions
was randomized across the subjects.
Data Analysis
The dependent measures of the experimental manipulations
used for the data analyses were RT CCE scores, ER CCE and
questionnaire ratings.
Crossmodal congruency effect scores were calculated by
subtracting the mean RT (or ER) in congruent trials from the
mean RT (or ER) in incongruent trials. Trials with incorrect
responses and trials in which subjects failed to respond within
2000 ms were discarded from the RT analysis (on average, 2.3
% of trials), whereas the ER was calculated as the percentage
of incorrect responses for all the valid trials (excluding only
the trials with a failed response within 2000 ms). CCE scores
were analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA with three
within-subject factors: Synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous),
Visuo-spatial viewpoint (first-person/third-person), and Body
similarity (virtual legs/wooden objects). In the presentation and
interpretation of RTs, we have mainly focused on the CCE scores
fromRT data rather than ER, as the RTCCE has been shown to be
more sensitive (Pavani et al., 2000; Austen et al., 2004; Shore et al.,
2006), however, we also report the ER in Table 2, and the ER CCE
analyses.
Due to the ordinal type of the questionnaire data, the
questionnaire scores were first ipsatized (Fischer and Milfont,
2010), and then analyzed with repeated measures ANOVA, using
the same three within-subject factors as for the CCE task data. The
significance (alpha) level used was 0.05. Significant interactions
were followed up with planned pairwise comparisons using two-
tailed paired t-tests. The alpha level of significance was adjusted
accordingly to the number of comparisons using the Bonferroni
method.
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were
calculated to assess the relationship between the questionnaire
ratings and CCE score.
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TABLE 2 | Crossmodal congruency task results.
Synchronous Asynchronous
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
REACTION TIMES
LEGS
1 POV 1220 (41) 1320 (49) 1200 (36) 1302 (43)
3 POV 1219 (42) 1234 (46) 1222 (36) 1246 (40)
OBJECT
1 POV 1148 (40) 1215 (47) 1151 (40) 1216 (43)
3 POV 1170 (43) 1200 (41) 1166 (33) 1201 (40)
ERROR RATES
LEGS
1 POV 0.04 (0.01) 0.08 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01)
3 POV 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)
OBJECT
1 POV 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.01)
3 POV 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Average reaction times (in milliseconds, upper panel) and error rates (in percentages, lower
panel) for virtual legs and wooden objects. Standard errors of the mean are shown in
brackets. 1 POV, First-person viewpoint; 3 POV, Third-person viewpoint; LEGS, Virtual
legs; OBJECT, Wooden objects.
RESULTS
Crossmodal Congruency
Effect. Reaction Times
The three-way repeated measures ANOVA on RT CCE
showed a significant main effect of Visuo-spatial viewpoint
[F(1,14) = 32.75, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.70]: the CCE magnitude
was larger when the viewed legs or control object were seen
from the first-person viewpoint (M = 83.7 ms, SEM = 13.0 ms)
than seen from the third-person viewpoint (M = 25.6 ms,
SEM = 9.4 ms). Not significant were the main effects of
Synchrony [F(1,14) = 0.25, p = 0.626, !2p = 0.02] and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 1.70, p = 0.214, !2p = 0.11]. Significant was
the two-way interaction between the Visuo-spatial viewpoint and
Body similarity [F(1,14) = 5.63, p = 0.033; !2p = 0.29]. Post hoc
analysis of this interaction showed a larger CCE in the first-person
viewpoint as compared to the third-person viewpoint condition,
but only when the participants viewed virtual legs [first-person
viewpoint: M = 101.9 ms, SEM = 19.4 ms, third-person
viewpoint:M = 19.2 ms, SEM= 10.6 ms; t(14)= 5.17, p< 0.001,
a(corr) = 0.0125], and not when they viewed the control objects
[first-person viewpoint: M = 66.5 ms, SEM = 9.2 ms, third-
person viewpoint: M = 32.1 ms, SEM = 10.6 ms; t(14) = 2.76,
p= 0.015, a(corr)= 0.0125]. The other two pairwise comparisons
did not reach the level of significance after correction for multiple
comparisons: no significant differences in the CCE were found
between legs or objects when they were viewed in the first-
person viewpoint [t(14) = 2.20, p = 0.044, a(corr) = 0.0125]
or when they were viewed in the third-person viewpoint
[t(14) =  1.34, p = 0.203, a(corr) = 0.0125]. Non-significant
were the two-way interactions between Synchrony and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 0.17, p = 0.690, !2p = 0.01] and between
Synchrony andVisuo-spatial viewpoint [F(1,14)= 0.16, p= 0.695,
!2p = 0.01]. The three-way interaction was also not significant
FIGURE 2 | CCE results. The visuo-tactile integration was the strongest in
the conditions where participants saw the virtual legs in the first-person
viewpoint and significantly differed from the conditions when they saw the
virtual legs in the third-person viewpoint, whereas the visuo-spatial viewpoint
did not significantly affect the visuo-tactile integration when participants were
seeing the wooden objects. The error bars depict the standard error of the
mean. Sync, Synchronous; Async, Asynchronous; 1 POV, First-person
viewpoint; 3 POV, Third-person viewpoint; LEGS, Virtual legs; OBJECT,
Wooden objects. **p < 0.01.
[F(1,14) < 0.01, p = 0.956, !2p < 0.01]. The mean RTs for each
condition are shown in Table 2. The CCE RTs are shown in
Figure 2.
Crossmodal Congruency
Effect. Error Rates
The three-way repeated measures ANOVA on ER CCE scores
showed a significant main effect of Visuo-spatial viewpoint
[F(1,14) = 6.54, p = 0.023, !2p = 0.32], where regardless of the
synchrony of stroking, seeing the virtual legs or control objects
in the first-person viewpoint (M = 0.3, SEM < 0.1) led to higher
ER CCE scores than seeing them in the third-person viewpoint
(M = 0.1, SEM < 0.1 ). Not significant were the main effects
of Synchrony [F(1,14) = 2.33, p = 0.149. !2p = 0.14] and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 1.53, p = 0.237, !2p = 0.10]. Not significant
were the two-way interactions between Synchrony and Visuo-
spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 0.07, p = 0.790, !2p = 0.01], between
Synchrony and Body similarity [F(1,14) = 0.66, p = 0.429,
!2p = 0.05] and between Visuospatial viewpoint and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 1.96, p = 0.183, !2p = 0.12]. The three-way
interaction between all three experimental factors was also not
significant [F(1,14) = 2.30, p = 0.152, !2p = 0.14]. The mean ERs
are shown in Table 2.
Questionnaire Ratings
Ownership
The questionnaire item: “I had the impression that the legs/objects
I was looking at were my real legs.” was used to assess the degree of
body ownership over the displayed virtual legs/wooden objects.
Data analysis of the item ratings revealed a significant main effect
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of Synchrony [F(1,14) = 6.39, p = 0.024, !2p = 0.31], showing
that illusory ownership was experienced more strongly when the
visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronous (M = 0.2, SEM= 0.1),
as compared to asynchronous (M =  0.2, SEM = 0.1).
Significant were also the main effects of Visuo-spatial viewpoint
[F(1,14) = 9.70, p = 0.008, !2p = 0.41] and Body similarity
[F(1,14) = 18.63, p = 0.001, !2p = 0.57]. Thus, the sense of
ownership was stronger when the legs/objects were seen from the
first-person viewpoint (M = 0.3, SEM = 0.1), as compared to the
third-person viewpoint (M =  0.3, SEM = 0.1), and when the
participants saw the virtual legs (M= 0.6, SEM= 0.3) as compared
to the control objects (M= 0.6, SEM= 0.3). Not significant were
the two-way interaction effects between Synchrony and Visuo-
spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 0.52, p = 0.482, !2p = 0.04], between
Synchrony and Body similarity [F(1,14) = 0.62, p = 0.446,
!2p = 0.04], and between Visuo-spatial viewpoint and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 3.14, p = 0.098, !2p = 0.18]. The three-way
interaction was also not significant [F(1,14) = 0.80, p = 0.387,
!2p = 0.05].
Illusory Touch
In order to assess the strength of experienced illusory touch
during the visuo-tactile stimulation, the participants rated the
questionnaire item: “I had the impression that the touch I saw was
applied to my legs.” The data analysis showed significant main
effects of Synchrony [F(1,14) = 23.39, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.62],
Visuo-spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 4.89, p = 0.044, !2p = 0.26],
and Body similarity [F(1,14) = 4.73, p = 0.047, !2p = 0.25].
Thus, the experience of illusory touch was reported stronger
when the visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronous (M = 1.0,
SEM= 0.1), as compared to asynchronous (M = 0.2, SEM= 0.1).
The intensity of the illusory touch was also larger when the legs or
objects were presented in the participant’s first-person viewpoint
(M = 0.5, SEM = 0.1), than when seen from the third-person
viewpoint (M = 0.3, SEM = 0.1), and when the subjects saw
the virtual legs (M = 0.6, SEM = 0.1) as compared to when
they saw the objects (M = 0.2, SEM = 0.1). Not significant were
the two-way interaction effects between Synchrony and Visuo-
spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 0.51, p = 0.487, !2p = 0.04], between
Synchrony and Body similarity [F(1,14) = 0.15, p = 0.708,
!2p = 0.01], and between Visuo-spatial viewpoint and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 0.17, p = 0.688, !2p = 0.01]. The interaction
between the three experimental factors was also not significant
[F(1,14) = 0.36, p = 0.559, !2p = 0.03].
Illusion of Agency
As the sense of embodiment also comprises of the sense of
being in control of a body or a body part, we asked participant
to report the strength of experienced sense of motor agency
by rating the questionnaire item: “I had the impression of
being able to move the virtual legs/objects.” The analysis of the
item ratings showed a significant main effect of Synchrony
[synchronous: M = 0.0, SEM = 0.1; asynchronous: M =  0.4,
SEM = 0.1; F(1,14) = 14.90, p = 0.002, !2p = 0.52], Visuo-
spatial viewpoint [first-person viewpoint: M = 0.0, SEM = 0.1;
third-person viewpoint: M =  0.3, SEM = 0.1; F(1,14) = 6.17,
p = 0.026, !2p = 0.31] and Body similarity [legs: M = 0.1,
SEM = 0.1; objects:  0.5, SEM = 0.1; F(1,14) = 13.52,
p = 0.002, !2p = 0.49]. Significant was the two-way interaction
between Synchrony and Visuo-spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 6.84,
p = 0.020, !2p = 0.33], but not between Synchrony and Body
similarity [F(1,14) = 0.01, p = 0.934, !2p < 0.01] or between
Body similarity and Visuo-spatial viewpoint [F(1,14) = 2.14,
p = 0.165, !2p = 0.13]. We have found a significant three-way
interaction between Body similarity, Visuo-spatial viewpoint and
Synchrony [F(1,14) = 6.10, p = 0.027, !2p = 0.30]. The post hoc
analysis of the interaction effect revealed only one significant
pairwise comparison, showing that the sense of motor agency was
stronger when the participants were seeing objects in the first-
person viewpoint during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation
(M =  0.1, SEM = 0.2), as compared to seeing them during
asynchronous stimulation [M =  0.8, SEM = 0.2; t(14) = 3.87,
p = 0.002, a(corr) = 0.008], although the average ratings in
both conditions were low. Other pairwise comparisons did not
reach the level of significance after the correction for multiple
comparisons, adjusted at a(corr) = a/6 = 0.008 [Legs-1POV-
Sync/Legs-1POV-Async: t(14) = 1.78, p = 0.096; Legs-1POV-
Sync/Legs-3POV-Sync: t(14) = 2.00, p = 0.066; Legs-1POV-
Sync/Objects-1POV-Sync: t(14) = 2.79, p = 0.014; Legs-3POV-
Sync/Objects-3POV-Sync: t(14) = 1.97, p = 0.069; Objects-
1POV-Sync/Objects-3POV-Sync: t(14) = 2.04, p= 0.060].
Illusion of Proprioceptive Leg Rotation
In order to assess the subjective changes in proprioceptive sense
of participant’s legs position due to the manipulation of viewpoint
we used the questionnaire item: “I had impression that my legs had
changed position.”
The analysis of the item ratings revealed that the main effect
of Synchrony was not significant [synchronous: M =  0.2,
SEM= 0.1; asynchronous:M = 0.3, SEM= 0.1; F(1,14)= 2.25,
p= 0.156, !2p = 0.14]. Significant where the main effects of Visuo-
spatial viewpoint [first-person viewpoint:M =  0.5, SEM = 0.1;
third-person viewpoint: M = 0.0, SEM = 0.2; F(1,14) = 5.19,
p = 0.039, !2p = 0.27] and Body similarity [legs: M = 0.2,
SEM = 0.2; objects: M =  0.6, SEM = 0.1; F(1,14) = 11.34,
p= 0.005, !2p = 0.45]. We found a significant two-way interaction
between Synchrony and Visuo-spatial viewpoint [F(1,14)= 17.88,
p = 0.001, !2p = 0.56]. Further post hoc analysis of the interaction
effect showed that the proprioceptive illusion of leg rotation was
stronger during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, but only
when the legs or objects were presented in the third-person
viewpoint [synchronous: M = 0.3, SEM = 0.2; asynchronous:
M = 0.2, SEM= 0.2; t(14)= 3.71, p= 0.002, a(corr)= 0.0125]
and not when seen in the first-person viewpoint [synchronous:
M =  0.6, SEM = 0.1; asynchronous: M =  0.4; SEM = 0.1;
t(14) = 1.01, p = 0.332, a(corr) = 0.0125]. Seeing the legs or
objects in the third-person viewpoint during synchronous visuo-
tactile stimulation also resulted in stronger proprioceptive illusion
than seeing them in the first-person viewpoint [t(14) = 4.00,
p = 0.001, a(corr) = 0.0125]. The differences in average
ratings between first- and third-person viewpoint when legs
or objects were seen during asynchronous stroking were not
significant [t(14) =  0.79, p = 0.445]. Not significant were the
two-way interactions between Synchrony and Body similarity
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[F(1,14) = 0.33, p = 0.575, !2p = 0.02] and between Visuo-
spatial viewpoint and Body similarity [F(1,14) = 0.82, p = 0.382,
!2p = 0.06]. Not significant was also the three-way interaction
between the experimental factors [F(1,14) = 3.41, p = 0.086,
!2p = 0.20].
Based on the prediction that the illusion of proprioceptive
leg rotation should be stronger in the synchronous condition
where the virtual legs are presented in the third-person viewpoint
as compared to the first-person viewpoint, and thus result in
different pattern of responding across conditions as compared
to the other three questionnaire items, the ratings of this
item were used as a control for a bias in responding to the
other three questionnaire items due to suggestibility or social
desirability. Thus, we compared the ratings of this item (Illusion
of proprioceptive leg rotation) in the condition where the
virtual legs were viewed from the first-person viewpoint during
synchronous visuo-spatial stimulation with the ratings of other
three questionnaire items (Illusory ownership, Illusory touch and
Illusion of motor agency) of the same condition. The ratings of
the Illusion of proprioceptive leg rotation item were significantly
lower than the ratings of the Illusory ownership [two-tailed paired
t-test: t(14) = 5.83, p < 0.001, a(corr) = 0.017], Illusory touch
[two-tailed paired t-test: t(14)= 5.94, p< 0.001, a(corr)= 0.017]
and Illusion of motor agency [two-tailed paired t-test: t(14)= 3.00,
p = 0.010, a(corr) = 0.017] of the same condition. The average
ipsatized questionnaire ratings are shown in Figure 3.
Correlation Between CCE
and Questionnaire Data
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated
to assess the relationship between the questionnaire ratings
and CCE score. In particular, we correlated the ratings of the
four questionnaire items of the condition where participants
viewed the virtual legs from a first-person viewpoint during
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation with the CCE score
obtained during the same condition. None of the correlation
coefficients was statistically significant [Illusory ownership:
r(15) = 0.21, p = 0.450; Illusory touch: r(15) = 0.32, p = 0.238;
Illusion of motor agency: r(15) =  0.05, p = 0.850; Illusion of
proprioceptive leg rotation: r(15) = 0.36, p= 0.190].
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated how visuo-tactile integration and
leg ownership depend on the visuo-spatial viewpoint using the
virtual leg illusion paradigm. The participants were viewing
either legs or control objects from either a first-person or third
person viewpoint on an HMD, while receiving synchronous or
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation. The study revealed two
major findings about the mechanisms of multisensory integration
for stimuli from the lower limbs and the sense of leg ownership.
First, the data show that the first-person visuo-spatial viewpoint
enhances the sense of leg ownership and the interference of visual
over tactile cues at the lower limbs. This finding further extends
the important role of visual top-down factors, here the first-person
viewpoint, to the integration of leg-related multisensory stimuli
and leg ownership as previously shown for hands (Pavani et al.,
2000; Zopf et al., 2010) and the full body (Petkova et al., 2011;
Maselli and Slater, 2014). Second, we show that the viewpoint
effect on the multisensory integration of stimuli from the lower
limbs is stronger when legs are shown, as the CCE magnitude
decreased for non-leg control objects.
Top-down Modulation of the Crossmodal
Congruency Effect
The CCE RTs revealed the highest impact of visual distractors
when the virtual legs were presented from the first-person
viewpoint, indicating a stronger degree of visuo-tactile
interference compared to third-person viewpoints and compared
to the wooden blocks seen from the first-person viewpoint.
Thus, the CCE, based on dominance of task-irrelevant visual
stimuli over tactile stimuli, decreased when the legs were viewed
in the third-person visuo-spatial viewpoint (also not differing
in magnitude from the condition in which the blocks were
presented in the third-person viewpoint). Similarly, the effect
of visuo-spatial viewpoint on multisensory integration was also
reflected in ERs, which decreased when the legs or objects were
presented in the third-person viewpoint. The current findings
show that visuo-tactile integration for the legs as quantified by the
CCE does not only depend on the bottom-up, temporo-spatial
visuo-tactile stimulation (e.g., prior visuo-tactile tapping), but
also on two visual top-down factors: a pre-existing internal body
representation (i.e., corporeal similarity of the virtual legs) and
the visuo-spatial viewpoint.
The performance on the CCE task has been associated with
the activity of multimodal neurons in premotor and posterior
parietal regions, which respond to stimulation within their tactile
receptive fields on the body as well as to visual stimuli appearing
within the peripersonal space surrounding the given body part
despite positional changes of the body part (Maravita et al., 2003;
Macaluso and Maravita, 2010). As such it has been proposed that
they process multisensory stimuli in a common body-centered
(arm- or leg-centered) reference frame (Rizzolatti et al., 1997;
Graziano and Gross, 1998; Graziano et al., 2000; Pouget et al.,
2002; Avillac et al., 2005). It has been suggested that such body-
part centered multisensory coding of stimuli, implemented in
premotor and posterior parietal multimodal neurons do not only
map the location of body parts in space (Lloyd et al., 2003), but
are also fundamental in body ownership (Maravita et al., 2003;
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2007; Zopf et al., 2010; Blanke,
2012).
In our study, viewing the wooden objects in first-person
viewpoint reduced the CCE amplitude as compared to viewing
the virtual legs in the same viewpoint. Comparable results were
also reported in a study with the full body illusion paradigm
(Aspell et al., 2009, 2010), where seeing a body modulated
the CCE but not when seeing a body-sized control object. We
found that visuo-tactile integration as quantified by the CCE was
further decreased when the legs or wooden blocks were presented
in the rotated orientation, mimicking a third-person viewpoint
(i.e., providing a visual reference frame that did not match the
egocentric, somatotopic and proprioceptive) reference frame of
the legs, compatible, with weakened visuo-tactile integration due
to misalignment (i.e., the coordinates within which the visual
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FIGURE 3 | Questionnaire results. The figure represents the average ipsatized ratings of the Virtual leg illusion questionnaire. Ownership: The ratings of the
experienced illusory ownership were higher when the participants were seeing the virtual legs (Body similarity: p = 0.001), when the dummy legs or objects were
seen from the first-person viewpoint (Visuo-spatial viewpoint: p = 0.008) and when the visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronous (Synchrony: p = 0.024). Illusory
touch: The strength of the experienced illusory touch was stronger in the conditions where participants saw the virtual legs (Body similarity: p = 0.047), when the
legs or objects were presented in the first-person viewpoint (Visuo-spatial viewpoint: p = 0.044), and when the visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronous
(Synchrony: p < 0.001). Illusion of motor agency: The sense of motor agency was the strongest during the condition where the virtual legs were seen in the
first-person viewpoint and stimulated in synchrony with participants’ real legs (three-way interaction: p = 0.027). Illusion of proprioceptive rotation: The illusory sense
that legs have changed position was rated the strongest in the conditions where the visuo-tactile stimulation of virtual legs or objects was synchronous and they were
presented in the third-person viewpoint (Visuo-spatial viewpoint  Synchrony: p = 0.001). The error bars depict the standard error of the mean. Sync, Synchronous;
Async, Asynchronous; 1 POV, First-person viewpoint; 3 POV, Third-person viewpoint; LEGS, Dummy legs; OBJECT, Wooden objects. **p < 0.01.
distractors were mapped were not aligned with the somatotopic
coordinates of the vibro-tactile stimuli). Similar findings have
been reported for hands, where the tactile stimuli were remapped
to the location of visual distractors superimposed over rubber
hands, but only when they were spatially aligned with the subject’s
real hands, and not when rotated by 90°, even if this posture
is physically possible for the hands but not for the legs (Pavani
et al., 2000). Comparable effect of the viewpoint on the RT
CCE was also shown for the whole body (Maselli and Slater,
2014). Altogether, our CCE results suggest that the multisensory
representation of the lower limbs is susceptible to changes
of the visual reference frame, as shown for hands and trunk
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 17499
Pozeg et al. Leg Illusion, CCE, and Ownership
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Heed
and Röder, 2012). The first-person visuo-spatial viewpoint thus
contributes to successful integration of leg-related visuo-tactile
stimuli.
Contrary to our predictions, the synchrony of visuo-tactile leg
stimulation prior to the CCE task did not significantly modulate
the CCE score, while it instead increased the subjective sense
of body ownership as assessed by the questionnaire (see below).
The lack of a synchrony effect shows that the congruent visual
and proprioceptive information about appearance and position
of the legs alone was sufficient to induce the observed changes
in the CCE performance, without requiring additional visuo-
tactile synchronous tapping (Pavani et al., 2000; Slater et al.,
2010; Maselli and Slater, 2013, 2014; van Elk et al., 2013).
Alternatively, as the delivered visual and vibrotactile stimuli in
the crossmodal congruency task are temporally synchronized, the
task itself might have generated some effects, resembling those
of the illusion per se and canceling out any condition difference
due to prior visuo-tactile tapping. Similar findings on the lack
of the visuo-tactile tapping synchrony effect on the CCE have
been reported for the rubber hand, where the vibro-tactile and
visual stimuli were presented simultaneously (Zopf et al., 2010)
and for the full-body illusion, when a temporal delay of 33 ms
was used (Aspell et al., 2009). However, when a larger delay
of 150 ms (Zopf et al., 2010) or 233 ms (Aspell et al., 2009)
was introduced between the visual and vibro-tactile stimuli, the
CCE was significantly modulated, also by the synchrony of prior
stroking. Thus, simultaneous presentation of visual and vibro-
tactile stimuli during the present CCE measurements might have
reset any synchrony-specific effect due to previous stimulation
(Zopf et al., 2010).
Multisensory Representation of Upper
and Lower Body Parts
The present study can also offer an insight into potential
differences between upper and lower extremities in terms of
their multisensory representation. Although our results cannot
be directly compared to the existing studies due to different
methodologies, experimental designs, and because we did not
measure hand responses in the present study, some considerations
are merited. Thus, our CCE results closely relate to the study of
Pavani et al. (2000), which showed that anatomically incongruent
posture of the rubber hand (rotated by 90°) reduces the CCE,
which was comparable to the level where no rubber hand was
presented in that study. However, a series of studies demonstrated
that showing a photograph or a contour drawing of a hand during
a CCE task resulted in relatively high CCE amplitude even if
the presented hand image was rotated by 45 or 180°, or shown
orthogonally to the participant’s real hand (Igarashi et al., 2004,
2007). Compared to the results of the present study, where the
presentation of lower limbs in a tilted orientation significantly
decreased CCE magnitude (but not completely abolished it),
these previous findings indicated that the hands’ multisensory
representation and its surrounding space might be more plastic
than those of the lower extremities. Only few studies directly
compared the multisensory representation of feet and hands
and showed that the feet representation does not differ from
that of the hands as inferred from the temporal order judgment
tasks and CCE (Schicke and Röder, 2006; Schicke et al., 2009;
van Elk et al., 2013). However, it was shown that anatomical
incongruence and crossed posture modulated the CCE for the
hands but not for the feet, indicating that visual information
might be more strongly integrated with tactile and proprioceptive
signals for the hands as compared to the feet (van Elk et al.,
2013).
Although differences in the multisensory representation
between upper and lower extremities might be assumed due
to the fact that normally, hands can be positioned in different
orientations and are used for frequent manual actions (providing
greater variability of visual and proprioceptive information
regarding their location than legs), we cannot conclude based
on our leg data whether these differences exist, requiring direct
comparisons between upper and lower limbs in sensitivity (or
robustness) to various deviations from the habitual first person
viewpoint.
Subjective Experience of Embodiment
At the phenomenological level, all three experimental
factors—corporeal similarity, first-person visuo-spatial viewpoint
and synchrony of stroking contributed to the illusory sense of
ownership over virtual legs and illusory touch.
The present study confirms a large body of data showing that
bottom-up as well as top-down signals contribute to the sense of
hand and full-body ownership, and is thus in accordance with
previous studies using the RHI paradigm, which demonstrated
that sense of ownership for a hand emerges from spatiotemporal
congruence of visual, tactile and proprioceptive cues as well
as pre-existent body representations, including the anatomical
resemblance (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), rules of general
body configuration (Farne et al., 2000; Pavani et al., 2000;
Austen et al., 2004; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005) and laterality (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris,
2010; Tsakiris et al., 2010). The present data conforms to a
neurocognitive model of body-ownership based on the rubber
hand illusion (Tsakiris, 2010) and extends its validity to the
lower extremities. According to that proposal, the experience of
illusory ownership is established by first comparing the visual,
anatomical and structural characteristics of the viewed object
with a pre-existing body model, and secondly, the current
postural and anatomical features of own body with those of
the viewed object. Then the system compares the reference
frames of current synchronous visual and tactile input, and
resolves the multisensory conflict by recalibrating the visuo-
tactile coordinates into a unique body-centered reference frame,
leading to the touch referral and induction of body ownership. As
predicted by the model and observed in our data, incongruences
in anatomical shape characteristics between own physical legs
and what was visually presented (such as wooden blocks),
between postural features (such as discrepancy between actual
and observed leg posture in the third-person viewpoint) and
asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation reduce the sense of
ownership for the virtual legs. Our data, however, cannot inform
whether the order of critical comparisons as suggested by the
model is correct.
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Important for understanding the different components of the
sense of body ownership (Longo et al., 2008), the subjective
reports in our study show discrepancy between experienced body
ownership and illusory touch. Although illusory leg ownership
was significantly modulated by the visuo-spatial viewpoint and
corporeal similarity, illusory touch (i.e., perceiving the touch
on the virtual leg or wooden object) was experienced also
when the synchronous visuo-tactile tapping was applied to the
wooden blocks, or when it was applied in the non-habitual visuo-
spatial viewpoint. Similar findings were also reported before (for
example: Lenggenhager et al., 2007;Hohwy and Paton, 2010, study
2). The fact that we observed a modulation of illusory touch
without illusory leg ownership (in case of wooden objects or third-
person viewpoint) indicates a dissociation of the two phenomena,
contradicting arguments that illusory touch (or referral of touch)
is a sufficient marker of body ownership (Makin et al., 2008).
The dissociation between illusory touch and ownership was
also found by a comprehensive principal component analysis
of subjective reports on the RHI (Longo et al., 2008) and
described in neurological patients with somatoparaphrenia, who
deny ownership for their left hand, but nevertheless can feel
being touched on the very hand (Aglioti et al., 1996; Bottini
et al., 2002). Additional evidence for the dissociation between
illusory touch and ownership stems from an ERP study on the
RHI (Press et al., 2007), showing that synchronous visual and
tactile stimuli enhance early somatosensory SEP components
regardless whether the visual stimulus is applied to a life-like
virtual hand or non-bodily object, whereas later negative SEP
components were reported to increase only with respect to
the anatomical resemblance of the viewed object, suggesting
temporally distinct contributions of the bottom-up and top-down
mechanisms to the RHI. Based on the present findings, the
experience of illusory touch mainly depends on the temporal
correlation of visuo-tactile stimuli and it is less affected by
violations of anatomical and postural congruency, whereas in
addition to the visuo-tactile spatiotemporal correlation, top-
down effects such as first-person visuo-spatial viewpoint and
anatomical resemblance determine the experience of illusory
body ownership.
Comparing CCE Task and Subjective
Experience of Ownership
A comparison between the present CCE task results and
subjective ratings reveals several differences. First, the synchrony
of visuo-tactile stimulation significantly increased the experience
of illusory leg ownership in comparison to asynchronous
stimulation as assessed by the questionnaire, whereas this
difference was absent in the CCE results. As already mentioned
earlier in the discussion, the discrepancy might stem from
the simultaneous onset of vibro-tactile and visual cues in the
CCE task, which might have been a form of synchronous
multisensory stimulation directly modulating the leg ownership
illusion potentially dominating the effects of prior stroking on
the CCE results. Second, we have also observed differential
contributions of the two experimental factors (visuo-spatial
viewpoint and corporeal similarity) to the multisensory effects
CCE and the explicit feelings (questionnaire) related to leg
ownership. The magnitude of the CCE was modulated by
the interaction between the two factors, i.e., the strongest
effect was observed when the legs, and not the objects, were
presented in the first person visuo-spatial viewpoint, whereas
according to the item ratings, both experimental manipulations,
independently of each other, affected the subjective experience of
leg ownership.
These discrepancies suggest that both measures capture two
related, but not fully overlapping processes. The CCE reflects the
processing and integration ofmultisensory stimuli in peripersonal
space. The change in the CCE induced by our experimental
manipulation, therefore, at most reflects a modulation in the
representation of the space surrounding the body part, which
in turn may depend on the way that body part is represented
and perceived. Questionnaire data, instead, tap on the subjective
feeling related to body experience. Thus the strength of visuo-
tactile interactions, as measured by the CCE, cannot be directly
equated with the subjective sense of ownership, although changes
in the CCE may reflect concurrent changes in body experience
(Maravita et al., 2002a,b; Pavani and Castiello, 2004; Aspell et al.,
2009; Zopf et al., 2010; Sengul et al., 2012; Maselli and Slater,
2014). Also, the brain activity associated with the integration
of visual, tactile and proprioceptive information in the rubber
hand illusion has been found in several brain regions, including
ventral intraparietal sulcus, premotor cortex, lateral occipital
complex, operculum and cerebellum (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005;
Makin et al., 2007), whereas an increased brain activity associated
with the conscious experience of ownership for a rubber hand
has been observed only in the ventral premotor area (Ehrsson
et al., 2004, 2005) and in the posterior insula (Tsakiris et al.,
2007), again compatible with the presence of shared and distinct
mechanisms.
Future research may address the open issues and limitations
of the current study, and in particular investigate the relationship
between multisensory integration and subjective sense of
ownership. This could, amongst others, include probing the
effects of different temporal delays between distractors and target
stimuli on CCE and questionnaire measures. This could also be
tested in the presence or absence of prior induction of illusion
with visuo-tactile tapping.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the present study shows that decreased corporeal
similarity and larger divergence from the habitual first-person
viewpoint reduce the sense of ownership for lower extremities and
lessen the integration of visuo-tactile stimuli. By using the virtual
leg illusion the study contributes to the understanding of how
the multisensory lower extremities are represented in the brain.
Understanding the neural mechanisms and the determinants of
conscious experience for hands and legs might have important
translational application in patients with the central and
peripheral neural damage affecting the functionality and the
perception of one’s own body (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Marasco et al.,
2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2015). While many data are already
available in the case of upper limb representation, knowledge
concerning the lower limb is much poorer. Considering the large
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number of patients with disabilities affecting the lower-limbs,
due to spinal cord injury or lower limb amputation, these
available hand data on multisensory mechanisms and bodily
experience may not be sufficient and need to be extended by
leg data. Research on multisensory stimulation paradigms and
bodily illusions modulating lower limb ownership might be
particular relevant especially for technological devices and new
rehabilitation protocols aimed at restoring lower limb functions.
Our study on the one hand confirms the importance of top-down
signals for leg representations and, on the other hand, proposes
a sensitive and easy-to-apply paradigm to measure the extent of
body ownership and embodiment specifically for the lower limb.
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